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Abstract
As computing appliances increase in use and handle more critical information and
functionalities, the importance of security grows even greater. In cases where the
device processes sensitive data or performs important functionality, an attacker may
be able to read or manipulate it by accessing the data bus between the processor
and memory itself. As it is impossible to provide physical protection to the piece of
hardware in use, it is important to provide protection against revealing confidential
information and securing the device’s intended operation. Defense against bus attacks
such as spoofing, splicing, and replay attacks are of particular concern.
Traditional memory authentication techniques, such as hashes and message au-
thentication codes, are costly when protecting off-chip memory during run-time. Bal-
anced authentication trees such as the well-known Merkle tree or TEC-Tree are widely
used to reduce this cost. While authentication trees are less costly than conventional
techniques it still remains expensive. This work proposes a new method of dynami-
cally updating an authentication tree structure based on a processor’s memory access
pattern. Memory addresses that are more frequently accessed are dynamically shifted
to a higher tree level to reduce the number of memory accesses required to authenti-
cate that address. The block-level AREA technique is applied to allow for data con-
fidentiality with no additional cost. An HDL design for use in an FPGA is provided
as a transparent and highly customizable AXI-4 memory controller. The memory
controller allows for data confidentiality and authentication for random-access mem-
ory with different speed or memory size constraints. The design was implemented on
a Zynq 7000 system-on-chip using the processor to communicate with the hardware
design. The performance of the dynamic tree design is comparable to the TEC-Tree
in several memory access patterns. The TEC-Tree performs better than a dynamic
design in particular applications; however, speedup over the TEC-Tree is possible to
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With the recent rapid growth of modern cyber infrastructure, devices that process
sensitive data and perform essential services have become extremely widespread. In-
stead of using expensive general-purpose computers, a wide variety of applications
employ low cost and low power devices to perform specific applications. Appliances
that do not require extensive amounts of computing power routinely employ smaller
processing systems to act as a control unit. Often referred to as embedded systems,
these devices usually consist of a microprocessor, a limited amount of off-chip memory,
and methods of interfacing with a broader system. Embedded systems are present in
various critical applications such as smart homes, medical devices, and automobiles
[2]. These devices are less susceptible to traditional software attacks as their appli-
cations are comparatively simple and more difficult to exploit [3]. Therefore, attacks
on the hardware of an embedded device are oftentimes more effective. Physical se-
curity is often too costly and difficult to achieve for many applications, leaving the
embedded system vulnerable to examination by an attacker.
Embedded devices are employed in creating a system called the ”Internet of
Things” (IoT). The IoT consists of numerous devices that share a network in order to
quickly pass information about their application to other devices on the network [4].
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
IoT networks have evolved to the point of controlling devices that can have signifi-
cant impact on a consumer’s life. For example, smart homes often use a number of
connected computing devices to provide various impactful services to the user. There
is a growing concern about the security of these devices as they may handle private
information and can perform life saving functionality [5]. A security breach into a
single device in an IoT can cause serious danger to an individual utilizing the network.
The devices that create an IoT network are often extremely susceptible to memory
attacks and it is imperative that their data and functionality is secured effectively.
In addition to embedded systems, other forms of small scale computing devices
are often used in similar applications that may additionally require protection. A
system on a chip (SoC) often consists of one or multiple hard-core processors and
programmable logic. The same kind of programmable logic is also found in a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA). A processor can interface with programmable logic
in order for software applications to offload specific functionality to the hardware
design. While hard-core processors are physically implemented on a silicon chip,
additional soft-core processors can be generated as needed using the programmable
logic of SoCs. Soft-core processors are able to run software applications and interface
with the other on-chip components but are limited in resources by the FPGA fabric.
These All Programmable SoCs (APSoC) use Random Access Memory (RAM) to
help store software and data. An attacker with physical access to a SoC device is
able to interface with this memory bus, allowing them to read or modify any data
sent through the bus [6]. This allows for memory attacks such as spoofing, slicing,
and replay attacks to be performed. Despite this vulnerability to physical attacks,
many modern SoC FPGAs leave the memory unprotected, allowing attackers to access




The goal of this work was to provide a transparent and simple to integrate design
that can be utilized by those aiming to secure memory. While the design proposed in
this work is concerned with the protection of an SoC that has available programmable
logic, the concepts introduced can be extended to various embedded system platforms.
The focus of the protection is the integrity of data transferred from the processor of an
SoC to off-chip memory. Particularly, providing data confidentiality and protection
against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are the main concerns of the design. An
authentication tree design is used to detect any invalid data modification before the
data is forwarded to the central processing unit (CPU).
A new method of data authentication was developed by extending concepts of ex-
isting authentication tree designs. The performance and data overhead of this method
was compared to current memory protection techniques. A Zynq-7020 APSoC was
utilized for design prototype implementation and evaluation. The design is intended
to be implemented in programmable logic and used as a memory controller that in-
tercepts and modifies communication between the processor and memory. An AXI-4
interface protocol was used for the memory controller in order to interface with the
Zynq processor and memory components; however, this design can be implemented
in a variety of unique applications. Customizability and scalability are built into
the design. For example, the data sizes and the algorithms used for authentication
and encryption are interchangeable themselves. The relatively low overhead and easy
to customize nature of the design provides value for a range of different operations,





The device to be protected is assumed to be in an environment where physical access
is possible, and the memory bus is exposed to an attacker. Attacks on memory are
performed as the adversary has the capability to read or modify any data traveling
between the processor and RAM. For the purposes of this threat model, it is assumed
the device being protected is an APSoC that can interface with the processor and
RAM. The processor itself is considered secure, implying that the on-chip caches
contained within the processor are unable to be attacked. Additionally, it is assumed
that the OS running on the processor is trusted and the on-chip caches cannot be
monitored by the attacker.
As securing embedded devices remains the area of focus, traditional software at-
tacks while still a threat are not as pertinent to defend against. Most embedded
systems perform specific and simple applications that are not as susceptible to many
common software attacks. However, many software threats do exist and must be heav-
ily considered to protect against [7], but the work in this thesis focuses on hardware
attacks. Physical attacks on embedded systems are often possible as the processing
system of these devices is generally operating in insecure environments where physical
access is possible. The methods of attack that this work is most concerned with are
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
hardware MITM attacks that focus on the external memory of an embedded device.
Off-chip memory is especially vulnerable to numerous attacks because the bus be-
tween the processor and memory can be exposed. Data and address values sent to
external memory are able to be probed and can be read by an attacker [8]. An encryp-
tion algorithm is necessary to provide data confidentiality and protect sensitive data
transmitted on this memory bus from exposure. Many existing data ciphers allow
for adequate protection of data, such as AES [9]; however, data confidentiality is not
enough to adequately secure the system. Data authentication is additionally required
in order to prevent attacks that modify the data in ways that allow an attacker to
manipulate the functionality of the device.
2.1.1 Spoofing Attacks
The focus of spoofing attacks is not to reveal protected data, but instead to disrupt
the intended functionality of the device. In the most basic spoofing attack, an attacker
has access to the bus between the processor and memory then waits for a memory
fetch instruction to be sent. The attacker does not decrypt any memory blocks but
instead sends fake information to the processor [10]. This fake memory block disrupts
the normal program flow and can cause instability in the system if not detected.
2.1.2 Splicing Attacks
Splicing attacks are another type of bus attack in which the attacker replaces a
memory block with a modified block. Instead of replacing the memory block with
an arbitrary fake block, the block is replaced with a block of memory taken from a
different address [8]. The fake block is ensured to be properly encrypted and contain
valid data. Additionally, this adds complexity to defend against as the authentication




A memory replay attack consists of an attacker reading and saving a valid memory
block for injection into the system at a later time. The memory block is ensured
to contain valid data and can be injected into the same memory address [11]. These
attacks allow for previous states of the system to be accessed, prolonging functionality,
or allowing now illegal functionality to be repeated. Replay attacks are generally
the most costly attacks to protect against and are the primary area of focus for
authentication trees.
2.2 Memory Authentication Techniques
2.2.1 Hashes
One of the simplest forms of data authentication can be performed using crypto-
graphic hashes. A hash function creates a unique fixed-size output given a unique
variable-sized input [12]. A block of data can be hashed and that hash can be stored
securely on-chip in order to prevent attackers from accessing it. Every time data
is read, a newly computed hash of the data can then be compared with the hash
stored on-chip. This comparison is used to ensure that the data integrity has not
been compromised.
2.2.2 Message Authentication Codes
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are an authentication technique that utilizes
a hash function and a secret key in order to generate a small block of data that is
used for comparison. This method differs from simple hashing as the MAC itself does
not need to be hidden from an attacker. Both the message and secret key are used
to generate the code, as such only the secret key must be hidden [13]. Commonly,
the MAC is appended to the end of a block of data, as the attacker cannot reproduce
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it themselves. If the block is corrupted, the data receiver’s newly calculated MAC
wouldn’t match the expected MAC stored with the data.
2.2.3 Block-Level AREA Authentication
The block-level AREA Authentication scheme uses the diffusion proprieties of block-
level encryption to additionally provide authentication. The principle of this system
relies on utilizing the Added Redundancy Explicit Authentication (AREA) technique
[14]. In the AREA technique, a unique nonce is appended to the end of a plaintext
block, and the entire block is encrypted. On decryption, this added nonce is checked
in order to determine if the data block has been corrupted. This method relies on the
Shannon diffusion property to work properly. If even a single bit on the ciphertext is
modified, then it is statistically improbable that the correct nonce will be retained on
decryption. Traditionally in implementations of a block-level AREA authentication
technique, the nonce and the secret key must be stored securely while the ciphertext
is visible to an attacker. An encryption mode that has infinite error propagation,
such as AES in the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode, must be used. This error
propagation is used to ensure that if an error does occur that it is propagated to the
rest of the ciphertext.
2.3 Authentication Trees
Authentication trees are a method of providing memory encryption and authentica-
tion during run-time. They are used as an attempt to limit authentication overhead
compared to traditional authentication techniques. Oftentimes, the term “Integrity
Tree” is used in place of “Authentication Tree”. The fundamental design of this
authentication method is a tree structure that stores additional encrypted metadata
that must be decrypted in order to access further memory blocks [15]. Authentication
trees are used for protection against third-party intervention such as replay attacks
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and memory tampering. The main advantage of this technique over alternative au-
thentication methods is the lower performance overhead; however, the speed of each
memory transaction is still significantly negatively affected. The size of data stored
off-chip is also significantly increased depending on the method employed. Table
2.1 contains a summary of the main features and overheads for each authentication
method.
Table 2.1: Authentication Methods
Hashes MACs AREA Authentication Trees
Performance Overhead High High High Medium
Off-chip Overhead None High Medium High
On-chip Overhead High High None Low
Provides Encryption No No Yes Varies
Provides Authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes
2.3.1 Merkle Trees
A Merkle tree is an authentication tree structure that requires a cryptographic hash
function to be computed for each internal node of the tree [16]. It is a balanced tree
that uses equal-sized memory blocks as the leaves of the tree. A hash function is
applied to the concatenation of the values of both children nodes of an intermediate
node. The resulting hash is used as the value for that intermediate node. A hash is
calculated recursively for each node until the root of the tree is formed. Every node’s
value is subsequently dependent on the values of its children nodes as illustrated by
the structure in Figure 2.1.
The authentication calculations start at the leaves of the tree, which contains the
data being protected. During a read transaction, the target memory block’s hash is
computed then compared to the expected value contained in the internal nodes. This
process is then repeated until the root of the tree is reached. If the calculated hash
differs from the expected hash at any point, an exception can be raised to indicate that
data may have been tampered with. While the internal nodes are able to be safely
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Figure 2.1: Merkle Tree Structure
stored off-chip, the root hash must be stored securely on-chip. Protection against
replay attacks is provided as each time the contents of memory are modified, the root
hash is updated. It is infeasible for an attacker to supply tampered data that will
match the hash of the root node. Cryptographic hash functions are designed to be
resistant to collisions, that is it is impractical to calculate two different messages that
generate the same hash. The chances of two hashes colliding when using the SHA256
algorithm is statistically insignificant. Given the computing power of modern day
processors, on average it would take longer than the lifetime of the universe to brute
force search for a collision. Therefore it is safe to assume that an attacker would be
unable to tamper the data in a manner that would match the root hash.
Merkle trees cause a significant memory and computation overhead as each mem-
ory block requires hash values to be stored. On a write operation, the data is read
and authenticated, the data block is updated, and the hashes are recalculated for
each node related to the data block. A secure cache can be utilized to store tree data
in order to reduce the performance overhead of the authentication method. If the
10
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data stored in the cache is considered secure, an internal node can also act as a root
node for data blocks. This is performed to reduce the number of operations required
to validate memory [17].
2.3.2 The Parallelizable Authentication Tree
The Parallelizable Authentication Tree (PAT) is an attempt to increase the perfor-
mance of the Merkle tree by allowing the hash computations to be run in parallel
[18]. Each node of a Merkle tree is dependant on the value of their children’s hashes
requiring multiple dependant computations to be performed before retrieving the tar-
get hashes. PATs remove this dependence by instead generating numbers-used-once
(nonces) and Message Authentication Codes (MACs) for each node. The nonce value
can be generated randomly or deterministically, and it is updated each time the node
is written to. The MAC value of a node consists of a hash value computed using the
nonce value of both the node and its children nodes. Each node can then generate
the MAC independently of other nodes because the nonce of each node is always
available without computation. Data verification computations and tree updating
computations for PATs do not rely on each other and can be parallelized to increase
performance. As a nonce must be stored in addition to the hashes, the metadata
size of PATs is greater than the metadata size of Merkle trees. This extra storage
requirement adds additional memory costs to the authentication.
2.3.3 Tamper Evident Counter Tree
While previous methods only incorporate authentication into the design, the Tam-
per Evident Counter Tree or “TEC-Tree” [19] provides both data confidentiality and
authentication. The TEC-Tree aims to reduce the memory overhead of PATs and pro-
vide data encryption while allowing for the same performance benefits. The TEC-Tree
employs the block-level AREA scheme for data authentication. On a write operation,
11
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
Figure 2.2: Parallelizable Authentication Tree Structure
a nonce consisting of the memory address and a counter value is concatenated to the
data block being encrypted and written to memory. This nonce allows for a unique
tag to be checked each time memory is accessed to provide the authentication. To
reduce memory overhead and allow for parallelization, the counter values used in
the nonces are then encrypted and stored off-chip together in their data block. The
counter blocks are decrypted and utilized for verification when a value from memory
is read. The only value necessary to store securely on-chip is the counter value used to
create new nonces for each block of memory. A tree structure is formed as displayed
in Figure 2.3.
The counter value stored on-chip acts as the root, and the counter blocks serve
as the children nodes of the root. Leaves of the tree consist of ciphertext blocks that
contain the original data being protected and the additional nonce encrypted with the
block. As the nonce is encrypted in each block, Shannon’s diffusion property states
that any change at all in the encrypted block will cause the nonce value to not decrypt
properly. Any modification of the nonce will subsequently cause the authentication
12
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Figure 2.3: TEC-Tree Structure
to fail. When a read operation is performed, multiple instances of a decryption
engine can be used to decrypt information in parallel, consequently reducing the
performance overhead of this method. MITM attacks are able to be detected after
the first decryption of the counter block as the nonce value will not match what is
expected. A cache for the tree’s most recently accessed nodes can be added in order to
avoid reading tree data from memory to increase read speeds. An additional benefit of
the TEC-Tree is the ability to change the arity of the tree structure to accommodate
the requirements of the system it is being utilized in. Increasing the arity adds a larger
additional memory overhead, but reduces the amount of time required to access the
leaf nodes.
2.3.4 Dynamically Skewed Authentication Tree
2.3.4.1 Method One
Traditional authentication tree methods rely on static balanced tree structures to
protect memory. A balanced tree approach introduces excessive overhead for real
13
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time memory verification based on different memory access patterns. The Dynami-
cally Skewed Authentication Tree attempts to increase the performance of traditional
authentication tree methods by reorganizing the structure of the tree dynamically.
Nodes that were more frequently accessed are placed closer to the root of the tree
during runtime[20]. Shifting frequently accessed nodes to higher levels allows for
less tree traversal time to authenticate those data blocks by reducing the number of
verification computations and intermediate node accesses. Less frequently accessed
data blocks take significantly longer to authenticate; however, the time saved by re-
ducing authentication time of more frequently accessed nodes with typical memory
access patterns outweighs the negative performance impact of the lower weighted
nodes. Similar to the TEC-Tree, data block nodes are concatenated to the plaintext
implementing the block-level AREA technique providing memory encryption and au-
thentication. Nonces are generated in the same fashion as in the TEC-Tree, a simple
counter is stored securely on-chip to ensure each nonce is unique and never reused.
Conventional approaches store a group of individual memory blocks in a leaf node,
while this dynamic approach instead stores groups of memory blocks as sets. Each
node stores the locations in memory that share the same frequency of access. Memory
elements are stored on the lowest branch of the tree as leaf nodes and are referred to
as data chunks. A structure represented by Figure 2.4 is established.
Each data chunk stores a unique nonce that additionally contains the data nec-
essary to traverse to the root of the tree. Unlike the TEC-Tree, the first memory
block accessed is the leaf node of the tree. The data is authenticated up from the leaf
to the root of the tree. Traversal in this fashion impacts performance because the
intermediate counter chunk data must be fully read before the next parent node can
be accessed. The TEC-Tree does not suffer from this problem as the node protection
addresses stay the same every time memory is accessed. A look-up table is required
to map a node number to which data element is being protected. This differs from
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Figure 2.4: Dynamically Skewed Authentication Tree Structure: Method 1
the balanced tree whose natural ordering is used to determine which data block is
being protected by a node. An index for each data block is stored, along with the
corresponding node number protecting that data block. An element number is ad-
ditionally required to indicate which element in the node’s set represents the data
block. This look-up table incurs an additional on-chip memory cost as it must be
stored securely.
Dynamic restructuring of the tree requires two operations, set migration and re-
balancing. Set migration occurs when the frequency of a data block is increased and
needs to move to a different set. Since data blocks with the same frequency are
grouped, whenever a block is accessed it must be moved to a set that is one frequency
count higher. The algorithm for set migration is described in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Dynamically Skewed Authentication Tree Set Migration [20]
Data: a : data element
Q,P : pointers to Nodes;
P ← find(a);
Q← find(P ′sfrequency + 1);
if Q 6= ∅ then
remove a from P ’s set;
P ’s weight = P ’s weight - P ’s frequency;
add a to Q’s set;
Q’s weight = Q’s weight + Q’s frequency;
ShiftUp(Q);
if P 6= ∅ then
remove P from the tree;
else
Shift Up(P ’s Sibling)
end
else
create a new node T ;
T ’s right child is a new node N ;
T ’s left child is P ;
N ’s set = a;
N ’s weight = P ’s frequency + 1;
N ’s frequency = P ’s frequency + 1;
replace the old P in the tree by T ;
remove a from P ’s set;
P ’s weight = P ’s weight - P ’s frequency;
if P 6= ∅ then






Rebalancing must also occur when the nodes with a higher probability to be
accessed are lower down in the tree than a node with a lower probability of access.
In this case, nodes are shifted to fit the results of a Huffman encoding algorithm, as
described in Algorithm 2. This algorithm is further discussed in Section 2.4.1.
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Algorithm 2: Dynamically Skewed Authentication Tree Rebalance [20]
while T is not the root do
T’s weight = T’s right child weight + T’s left child weight;
if (T’s weight > T’s sibling weight +1) ∧ (T’s weight > T’s uncle weight)
then
Q ← parent of parent of T;
exchange T with T’s uncle;
exchange Q’s right and left children;
update T’s ancient parent’s weight;
end
T ← T’s parent;
end
2.3.4.2 Method Two
A second and similar method of implementing dynamically skewed authentication
trees is proposed in [21]. The most significant difference between this implementation
and the first is that data nodes are no longer stored in sets. Alternatively, a single
data node protects a single data element in memory. Eliminating the method of
storing data in sets allows the look-up table to no longer be necessary and eliminates
the added on-chip overhead costs associated with it. The block-level AREA concept is
still applied, with each data element being protected by a nonce. The nonce contains
the count of data accesses of that node and additional information to allow upwards
tree traversal. Leaf nodes of the tree are capable of protecting a configurable number
of data elements in order to reduce the storage overhead of the design. The structure
generated by this method is depicted in Figure 2.5
With the removal of the look-up table and data element sets, the restructuring
condition of set migration described by Algorithm 1 is no longer necessary. Instead,
all restructuring is performed by the rebalance operation outlined in Algorithm 2. As
with the previous method, on a write operation, the leaf node’s count is incremented
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Figure 2.5: Dynamically Skewed Authentication Tree Structure: Method 2
and the tree is rebalanced if necessary. This is applied recursively until the root of
the node is reached. If at any point, the nonce information does not correctly match
the expected count, then an authentication error is raised.
2.4 Static Optimal Binary Search Trees
2.4.1 Huffman Encoding
Huffman encoding is a technique of constructing an optimal binary search tree that
is widely used in the generation of lossless data compression using prefix codes [22].
Each leaf node of the tree consists of a weight used to guide the construction of the
tree. Compared to similar methods, this tree is uniquely generated from the bottom
up, ensuring optimality. The fundamental principle of the construction of a Huffman
tree is the recursive combination of a pair of nodes that will result in the lowest weight.
This new weight is then used to establish a new intermediate node of the tree, which
is then added to the pool of nodes for the subsequent combination. Combinations
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are continued until the root of the tree is formed, and the result is an optimal binary
search tree. Figure 2.6 demonstrates the construction of an optimal tree with the
Huffman algorithm.
Figure 2.6: Huffman Tree Construction
In this example, the tree construct begins with an initial set of terminal nodes
with varying weights. The pair of nodes resulting in the lowest weight (in this case,
nodes with weights 1 and 2) are combined to create an intermediate node with a
weight of three. Due to the unordered nature of the Huffman tree construction, the
leaf nodes can be rearranged to construct this node. In step 3, the pair resulting in
the lowest weight uses the terminal node with weight 4, and the newly constructed
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intermediate node. Finally, the last node is combined with the node created in step
3 and the root of the tree is formed.
2.4.2 Hu-Tucker
The Hu-Tucker algorithm generates an optimal binary search tree in a similar fashion
as the Huffman encoding algorithm with one key difference, the order of the leaf nodes
is preserved. Order preservation allows for nodes with both a frequency of access
count and an additional weighted constraint to remain ordered and still construct an
optimal search tree [23]. Historically, these ordered trees had been used for alphabetic
search trees. The weighted priority of the algorithm could potentially be capitalized
on to increase the speed of authentication trees. The construction of a Hu-Tucker tree
consists of three phases: combination, level assignment, and recombination. An initial
set of terminal nodes acts as the leaves of the tree and are combined to construct the
intermediate nodes. Each node contains a value and a weight associated with it. A
greedy algorithm is implemented to combine the two neighboring nodes that result
in the lowest weight into a single node. This process is repeated until all nodes are
combined and the root of the tree is formed. If there is more than one pair of nodes
with an equal combined weight, the pair with the leftmost node is selected. Figure
2.7 demonstrates the construction of an optimal tree with the Hu-Tucker algorithm.
In a process similar to Huffman encoding, the tree construction begins with an
initial set of weight terminal nodes. The key difference in this algorithm is that
the order of these terminal nodes must be preserved in the tree. Therefore, when
constructing the first intermediate node in step 2 the lowest weight pair would be a
node with weights two and one. However, these nodes are not directly next to each
other causing that pairing to be invalid. Instead, the lowest weighted pair of nodes
that are neighboring each other would be nodes 4 and 1. This pairing process is
applied until the root of the tree is formed.
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Figure 2.7: Hu-Tucker Tree Construction
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Flexible Ordered Dynamic Authentication Tree
3.1 Data Protection
3.1.1 Applied Block Level AREA
The data protection scheme employed in this authentication method relies on the
diffusion property proposed by Shannon in [24]. Diffusion expresses the statistical
relationship between the input plaintext and the resulting ciphertext of a given en-
cryption cipher. Particularly, if a single bit of the input plaintext is changed while
using the same key, the resulting ciphertext on average changes half of the ciphertext’s
bits. Routinely used modern ciphers, such as AES, are extensively studied to ensure
the diffusion properties are sufficient enough for the cipher to be secure. For this data
protection method, it is assumed any cipher in use meets this diffusion requirement.
In both the TEC-Tree and the Dynamic Authentication Tree designs, a nonce is ap-
pended to any plaintext to be encrypted and stored in memory. On decryption, this
nonce is compared to a previously stored nonce value that should match if data has
not been tampered with. If even a single bit of the data is modified in an encrypted
data block, on decryption the nonce has a negligibly low chance of remaining the
same. The number of possible plaintext blocks with the same nonce resulting from
the decryption of a tampered ciphertext is equal to 2b−n, where b is the size of the
data block in bits, and n is the size of the nonce in bits. The probability of the nonce
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[19]. With this fact, the size of the nonce can then be increased to increase security.
Intuitively, increasing the nonce size will also increase the extra memory overhead
of the authentication. This nonce size can then be tuned to specific applications in
order to balance security concerns versus extra storage costs.
3.1.2 Example
Considering an example case, assume we are using 128-bit blocks. A data block before
encryption is composed of a 96-bit payload and a 32-bit nonce. The nonce contains
an arbitrary value for this example, and in a real application, a larger nonce value can
be used with deterministic single-use values. The hex value 0xAD is being written to
memory, and the entire data block must be accessed in order to write this value. The
original value of the data block is all zeros. The data is encrypted using AES in ECB
mode with a secret key of 0x0. Figure 3.1 displays a case in which the ciphertext
data is not tampered with and the authentication succeeds.
Figure 3.1: Block-Level AREA Example: Pass
First, the original 128-bit data block is encrypted, producing a ciphertext that is
secure from the attacker’s analysis. Once this data block is necessary to be read again,
the data is decrypted, and as expected the original nonce matches the decrypted nonce
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value. Since the nonces match, it is safe to assume the data is untampered and the
authentication is successful. The data would then be forwarded to the CPU for further
processing as usual. In the opposite case, Figure 3.2 displays an authentication failure
using the block-level AREA technique.
Figure 3.2: Block-Level AREA Example: Failure
Just as in the previous example, the original data block is encrypted and produces
the same ciphertext. Here an attacker flips a single bit in an attempt to disrupt the
system. The now corrupted ciphertext is decrypted, and the resulting plaintext does
not match the original data block. Most importantly the decrypted nonce is different
than the original nonce. These nonces are then compared and the authentication
fails because of the mismatch. An authentication error can be raised, and the CPU
is notified that the data has been corrupted.
3.2 Tree Nodes
The leaf nodes of the authentication tree structure contain the data blocks that are
directly being protected by the tree. For the rest of this thesis, the leaf nodes will be
referred to as data nodes. Numerous ways to relate the data blocks being protected
to the leaves of the tree are possible. For example, the TEC-Tree [19] originally
proposes that a 192-bit data block is used for each leaf node. 128 bits of this node
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store the original data to protect, while the additional 64 bits are used to store a
nonce for authentication. AES with a 128-bit key in ECB mode then serves as the
encryption engine for the design. While this is a viable option, the memory overhead
for this method is considerable. Since the nonce used is half the size of the original
data, this implementation requires a significant storage overhead of 1.5 times the
original data size. The implementation suggested in [21] employs a similar design,
recommending a 256-bit data block. 128 bits of that block would contain the original
data while the other 128-bits contain a nonce storing tree metadata. This design
requires an even larger 2 times storage overhead. In an attempt to address this issue,
the approach used in this authentication tree design uses an implementation similar
to that applied in [25]. Instead of limiting the data block size to be aligned with a
cipher’s size requirements, different cipher mode implementations are used to allow
for variable data block sizes. Applicable modes of operation are further discussed in
Section 4.4. This customization option allows for a more flexible design that is able to
address various use cases. Intermediate nodes are generated using the frequencies of
access for each data node as specified in Section 3.6. Due to the fact that the counts
for each child node are stored in each intermediate node, these nodes are referred
to as counter nodes. Figure 3.3 displays the general structure of a data node and
counter node as used by the dynamic authentication tree.
Figure 3.3: Data and Counter Node Contents
The data node is separated into two parts, the data that is being protected and the
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nonce. The nonce contains the tree metadata required for tree traversal and a count
of the number of times the node has been accessed. Each data node protects a block
of data that can be any length specified by the application. As for the metadata,
the size requirements are less flexible. Both the counter node and data node share
the same metadata that stores the relationship between other nodes. When data is
accessed, the authentication begins at the bottom of the tree with the data nodes. In
order to traverse the tree from the bottom up, the parent node ID is required to be
stored by each node except the root node. This ID is represented by “Parent” field
in the metadata. The “Sibling” field represents the sibling ID of that node and is
utilized in checking rebalancing conditions for dynamic restructuring of the tree. The
ID of the node itself is also stored in the “Node ID” field, but this is an optional field
depending on the implementation of this design. The “Node ID” field is included
to allow for easier rebalancing but is not necessary if performed differently. As the
frequency of access is required for the block-level AREA scheme, this is also stored in
the metadata of each node as the “Counter” field. Whenever the tree is traversed, the
node’s current count is compared to its parent’s stored count. The parent node must
be a counter node that stores both the left and right children counts in the “Counter
Left” and “Counter Right” fields. There are two counters stored per counter node
and the “LR” is used to specify which counter must be compared. This value is
stored to indicate whether or not the current node is a left or right child node to its
parent. As the block-level area scheme utilizes the metadata as a nonce, additional
data may be added to the nonce if a design requires a larger level of security. For most
cases, simply comparing the counts of the node provides adequate authentication. For
applications with a large security risk, it may be desirable to increase the nonce size
and compare more information.
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3.3 Tree Data Addresses
It is required by the block-level AREA technique for the data node metadata to
be stored in the same area of memory as the data it is protecting. This causes
the actual location of the data stored in memory may vary from what the processor
expects when it sends requests. The memory controller must account for the data size
differences and provide the processor with the appropriate information. In this case,
the originally requested address that the processor expects is referred to as the virtual
address. The offset memory address where the data is actually stored is referred to
as the physical address. Every time memory is accessed, the entire memory block
needs to be read to properly decrypt the data; therefore, a memory block address
needs to be calculated. When a request is generated for a specified data block, the
data modification or data read is handled by the Data Modifier and the Data Filter
components specified in 4.3, respectively. The virtual address for the start of each
data block can then be calculated using Equation 3.1 and the physical address is
calculated using Equation 3.2. In this tree, the size of protected memory is N bytes
and the size of data blocks is D bytes, the size of a counter is C bytes, and the size
of the metadata is M bytes.
virtual address = address− (address (mod D + M)) (3.1)





∗ (D + M) (3.2)
To simplify memory address calculations, it is recommended to store the counter
node information together at the end of the protected memory area. The start address
of all counter node data would then merely be the memory size N . With this method,
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each counter node address can be calculated using Equation 3.3.
Counter Node Address = N + (2C + M) ∗Node ID (3.3)
3.4 Ordered Dynamic Authentication Tree
A dynamic authentication tree is a 2-arity tree consisting of data nodes as the leaf
nodes and counter nodes as the intermediate nodes. The structure of the tree depends
on the weighted frequency accesses of each data node. As previously discussed, the
block-level area scheme is applied to each node of the tree when data is accessed.
Data nodes consist of the underlying data being accessed and an injected redundant
nonce, containing metadata required for the traversal of the tree from the bottom
up. In the block level AREA scheme, the nonce data is considered redundant as
the nonce must already be capable of being generated before the memory block is
decrypted. This redundancy is required for the comparison of the generated nonce
with the original nonce in the encrypted data block. When a memory access is per-
formed, the entire data block including the nonce is first read and decrypted. Then
the metadata contained in the nonce is used to determine which counter node is used
as the data node’s parent. The parent node is then also read and decrypted, and the
parent node holds the access count of its child for comparison to apply the block-level
AREA scheme and provide authentication. This authentication process is repeated
recursively until the final root of the tree is reached. Secure on-chip storage is used
to store a master counter that is incremented on every write operation and used to
generate new nonces. The root counter node’s count is compared to this secure root
counter for authentication purposes. If at any point the authentication fails due to a
counter mismatch, the processor is alerted to an authentication error. Otherwise, the
requested data operation is performed as usual. To prevent additional unnecessary
performance overhead, data access frequencies are only updated on a write operation.
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On a write operation, the data node’s frequency count itself must first be updated.
As the tree is traversed upwards, each parent node’s stored left and right counts are
updated accordingly to their child nodes’ weight. The parent’s frequency access count
is incremented in addition. All operations performed on decrypted plaintext are per-
formed in secure programmable logic where an attacker is incapable of observing the
operations and plaintext data. When a write occurs, the tree additionally is inspected
to ensure that the new node weight is not higher than the weight of the nodes above
it. If the lower node’s weight is higher, then the tree is rebalanced and restructured.
While a number of algorithms provide a valid dynamic authentication tree, the focus
of this work is a new dynamic algorithm based on an ordered binary search tree.
The rebalancing condition and restructuring algorithm are detailed in Section 3.6.
The generic dynamic authentication tree structure is represented identically to the
description in Figure 2.5. Figure 3.4 displays the data structure of the authentication
tree that these specifications create with additional metadata information shown.
It is important to note that because the tree’s structure depends on the data
node access frequencies, the structure displayed here contains example information
to help describe them. This information is necessary to help explain the current
balanced state of the tree. As this is a dynamic tree, the particular configuration of a
tree given a memory access pattern is subject to change. Additionally, the dynamic
nature of the tree does provide inconsistent resulting performances depending on the
memory access pattern the tree is operating under, which is discussed further in
Section 3.7.2. It is evident in this example that the tree structure does not allow
a higher weighted node to be lower on the tree than a lower weighted node. This
allows for more rapid access to a data node that contains a higher frequency of
access. On a read operation for every level higher a data node is stored, it requires
one less counter node to be read and compared before it is fully authenticated. This
differs from traditional authentication tree methods which historically rely upon a
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Figure 3.4: Ordered Dynamic Authentication Tree
balanced tree that is agnostic to the number of times a data node has been accessed.
Given most memory access patterns, the more often a data block is accessed, it is
more likely that the node will be accessed again in the future. Thus weighting data
nodes and restructuring the tree as such should provide a substantial improvement
in performance for data blocks that are accessed often.
There are, however, downsides to this design compared to a design such as the
TEC-Tree. Rebalancing provides two extra operations that increase the performance
overhead of the design. Every time a write occurs, the tree must be checked for
rebalancing conditions as the node frequency being accessed is incremented. This
requires at least one additional node per level traversed to be read for a comparison
of their counts. On top of this extra operation, if the tree does in fact need to
be restructured, the counter nodes’ metadata must be updated. Depending on the
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rebalancing condition, which is further outlined in Section 3.6, additional nodes may
need to be read, updated, and written back to memory. If a rebalance condition was
not met, these nodes would not need to be accessed. Compared to a static tree design,
the extra rebalancing calculations provide a significant difference in performance for
each memory write operation. In light of this fact, certain memory patterns will
more favor a dynamic authentication tree structure versus a static authentication
tree structure, which is discussed and analyzed further in Section 3.7.2.
3.5 Tree Initialization
Before any tree accesses can be performed, the tree requires an initial state in order
to allow for dynamic restructuring or tree traversal to properly take place. The rebal-
ancing algorithm implemented allows for zero weighted counts, which then requires
only the metadata specifying the node’s relationship with each other to be initialized.
The tree begins as a balanced tree, with each node containing an equivalent count of
zero. No memory addresses have been accessed yet and each node begins with the
same probability of being accessed. Algorithm 3 contains an initialization routine for
a dynamic skewed tree.
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Algorithm 3: Dynamic Authentication Tree Initialization Routine
Data: N [T ] : Array of nodes of size T








for i← 0 to T − 1 do
N [i].ID ← i;
N [i].LR← ¬(i (mod 2));
N [i].parent← ((i + 1)/2)− 1;
if N[i].LR = 0 then
N [i].sibling ← i + 1;
else




In this case, to provide easy memory address calculations the counter nodes begin
with the root ID as zero. The node IDs are filled in starting at the highest level of
the tree downwards while assigning each node from left to right. With this method,
the initial tree’s nodes with an even ID will also be a left child node. The sibling
node ID can then be set based on whether or not the node is a left or right child. A
pattern emerges for the parent node ID; each node is originally a child of a parent
with half their ID minus one.
3.6 Dynamic Restructuring
During a program execution, as memory blocks are accessed the tree structure is
dynamically updated to place memory blocks with a higher frequency of access closer
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to the root of the tree. As each node is accessed, the count of that node is incremented
and its parent node’s left or right counter is also updated to ensure authentication
checks function properly. When a node’s weight is incremented, the new weight
needs to be compared to the existing node’s weights. This is done to ensure that
nodes with a lower frequency remain further from the root than nodes with a higher
frequency of access. As node data is stored encrypted in memory, it is infeasible to
read and decrypt all tree nodes and check each weight value on each memory access.
Performance of the memory accessed would be too greatly affected if each node were
to be read; therefore, instead of accessing the entire tree, a small subset of the tree
is validated each time memory is written to. A node contains the ID of that node’s
parent and its sibling node. Using this information, when a node is accessed, both its
parent node and that parent’s sibling are accessed. A parent’s sibling node is referred
to as an uncle node. The uncle node’s weight is compared to the current node’s new
weight. If the current node’s new weight is greater than the uncle node’s weight,
then the tree is flagged for rebalancing. The method of rebalancing in the tree design
presented here consists of three different possible cases used in order to preserve the
order of the data nodes. The first rebalancing case is described by Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4: Ordered Rebalancing Method #1
Data: Parent, Uncle, Sibling, Current
if Current’s LR 6= Uncle’s LR then
// Shift Uncle down
Uncle’s Parent ← Parent;
Uncle’s Sibling ← Sibling;
// Rotate Parent
Parent’s sibling ← Current;
Parent’s LR ← ¬ Parent’s LR;
// Update and Rotate Sibling
Sibling’s sibling ← Uncle;
Sibling’s LR ← ¬ Sibling’s LR;
// Shift Current Node Up
Current’s Parent ← Parent’s Parent;
Current’s Sibling ← Parent;
end
If it is desired to retain the order of the data nodes, this rebalancing case is only
valid if the current node’s left/right position is different than its uncle node’s left/right
position. In this case, the current node being accessed is shifted up a level by shifting
the parent node to the side and shifting the uncle node down a level. Figure 3.5
visualizes the steps in this process. To perform these operations, the parent and
sibling relationship stored in each node is able to be updated with the new case.
This allows the operation to be performed quickly and efficiently. It is necessary to
read and decrypt the parent, uncle, sibling, and current node data from memory to
perform these operations.
In the case that the uncle and current nodes do not match the left/right position,
a second rebalancing method must be implemented. If the first rebalancing method
were to be used, the leaf node order would be modified and invaliding the ordered
design. The second rebalancing method is described by Algorithm 5 and visualized
by 3.6.
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Figure 3.5: Ordered Rebalance Method 1
Algorithm 5: Ordered Rebalancing Method #2
Data: Parent, Uncle, Sibling, Current, Grand Uncle, Grand Parent
if (Current’s LR = Uncle’s LR) ∧ (Current’s LR 6= Grand Uncle’s LR)
then
// Shift Parent Up with Current Node
Parent’s Parent ← Grand Uncle’s Parent;
Parent’s Sibling ← Grand Uncle’s Sibling;
// Update Uncle
Uncle’s Sibling ← Current Node;
// Shift Grand Uncle Down
Grand Uncle’s Parent ← Parent;
Grand Uncle’s Sibling ← Sibling;
// Update Grand Parent
Grand Parent’s sibling ← Parent;
// Shift Sibling Up with Current Node
Sibling’s sibling ← Grand Uncle;
Sibling’s LR ← ¬ Sibling’s LR;
// Shift Current Node Up
Current’s Parent ← Grand Parent;
Current’s Sibling ← Uncle;
Current’s LR ← ¬ Current’s LR;
end
The second rebalancing method requires the Grand Uncle and Grand Parent
node’s information in addition to the same information from the first method. When
the current node is shift upwards, the parent node is not shifted downwards but
is instead updated with the grand uncle replacing the current node as a child. To
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Figure 3.6: Ordered Rebalance Method 2
keep the order of the leaf nodes, the grand uncle and the sibling’s left/right positions
are swapped. Both of these methods do not retain leaf node order if applied to the
case where the current node’s left/right value, the uncle node’s left/right value, and
the grand uncle’s left/right value are all equal. To address this final case, a third
rebalancing method is introduced as described in Algorithm 6 and displayed by 3.7.
Algorithm 6: Ordered Rebalancing Method #3
Data: Parent, Uncle, Sibling, Current, Grand Uncle, Grand Parent
if (Current’s LR = Uncle’s LR) ∧ (Current’s LR = Grand Uncle’s LR)
then
// Shift Grand Uncle Down
Grand Uncle’s Parent ← Grand Parent;
Grand Uncle’s Sibling ← Sibling;
// Update Grand Parent
Grand Parent’s sibling ← Parent;
Grand Parent’s LR ← ¬ Grand Parent’s LR;
// Update Uncle
Uncle’s Parent ← Grand Parent;
Uncle’s Sibling ← Grand Uncle;
Uncle’s LR ← ¬ Uncle’s LR;
// Shift Parent Up
Parent’s Parent ← Grand Parent’s Parent;
Parent’s Sibling ← Grand Parent;
end
Methods one and three are very similar, with the main difference being that the
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Figure 3.7: Ordered Rebalance Method 3
node operations are applied to one level above the current node. While the current
node’s information is not updated itself, the parent node is shifted upward, moving
both the current and sibling node up a level as well. Considering the grand uncle
must be accessed for this method as well as method two, when checking the rebalance
condition an additional qualifier must be added to ensure that a great grand uncle
exists and the root has not been reached. The final rebalance checking condition is
then expressed in Equation 3.4.
¬((Current Node′s LR = Uncle′s LR) ∧ (Parent′s Parent = 0))
∧(Current Node′s Weight > Uncle Node′s Weight)
(3.4)
3.7 Customizable Overhead Analysis
The authentication tree design presented here is highly customizable and is able to be
modified in order to accommodate a specific application’s needs. Real-time memory
authentication is costly in both performance and memory overheads. However, if one
aspect of an application contains larger performance or memory constraints, these
parameters can be easily tuned to tailor the design to those needs. Generally, there
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is a trade-off between speed and storage requirements, the faster the authentication
time the more extra memory overhead is required and vice versa. The overhead
for this proposed design is compared against the overhead of the base TEC-Tree
implementation described in [19] and the Dynamic Skewed Tree proposed by [21].
3.7.1 Memory Overhead
3.7.1.1 Off-Chip Overhead Cost
The additional off-chip memory costs associated with each design is as follows, where
TEC is a subscript used to denote relation to the TEC-Tree, skewed denotes relation
to the Dynamic Skewed Tree, and DAT denotes relation to the proposed Dynamic Au-
thentication Tree design. Table 3.1 describes the variables contained in the following
equations.
Table 3.1: Off-chip Memory Cost Summary
Variable Description
OTEC Overhead of the TEC-Tree
Oskewed Overhead of the original dynamic skewed tree
ODAT Overhead of the proposed dynamic authentication tree
lp The data payload size in bits
n The bit length of nonces













Where lp is the data payload size in bits, n is the bit length of nonces, and A
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is the arity of the tree. The relationship between off-chip memory costs for each
design turns out to be identical besides the variation in nonce sizes. Arity is also
a large contributing factor, as a large arity increases the off-chip storage size. As
the methodology of this design only contains algorithms for a tree arity of two, the
comparisons will focus on all design utilizing an arity of two. It is possible to expand
both the work presented in [21] and the work proposed in this thesis to allow for larger
aritys, but for the scope of this design that is saved for future work. Each overhead





The total memory overhead then relies solely on the nonce size of each design. All
authentication trees require a significant off-chip memory overhead, some exceeding
even two times the original data size. The nonce sizes for each design are shown
below.
nTEC = c + log2N (3.9)
nskewed = c + 3 ∗ log2N (3.10)
nDAT = c + 3 ∗ log2N (3.11)
Where c is the bit length of the counters used for authentication, D is the total
number of data nodes used in the tree. In the case of a dynamic tree, the design
relies additional stored metadata in order to traverse the tree structure. The proposed
method’s off-chip memory cost is slightly increased versus the TEC-Tree, but remains
the same as the Dynamic Skewed Tree. The optimal case for each node ID stored in
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the none metadata is a bit length of log2N . However in cases where data size is not
a significant issue, data alignment to 4 byte words can be more easily achieved by
setting the node ID lengths to 4 bytes each.
3.7.1.2 Memory Overhead Example
To put the overhead in perspective, consider a case where 1 KB of memory is to be
protected, and the total number of trees protecting memory is 2. Data nodes have
been configured to protect 64 bytes of memory each. Each tree then protects 512 B
of memory with 8 data blocks per tree. For easy memory alignment, a non-optimal
32 bits per node ID stored is configured, as displayed in the example in Figure 3.4.
A counter size of 32 bits has also been chosen for convenience. For any binary tree,
the number of intermediate nodes is equal to the number of leaf nodes subtracting
one. In this case the number of counter nodes is then 7. Figure 3.8 represents off-chip
memory with these parameters.
Despite containing large counter sizes and node ID sizes, the additional overhead
of this design is comparable to other authentication methods. The extra metadata
stored per node is 16 bytes, and the counter nodes require an additional 8 bytes to
store the left and right counters for comparison. Each tree produces an additional
15∗16+8∗7 = 296 bytes. To protect 1 KB of memory with this method, an extra 592
bytes is required, resulting in a (1024 + 592)/1024 = 1.578 times memory overhead.
The on-chip memory cost is simple. The size of the counter value used for au-
thentication and the root of the tree is customizable. Only a single counter per tree
used to protect memory is required to be stored on on-chip memory. Therefore, the
on-chip memory cost is equal to Equation 3.12. The on-chip memory cost is the same
for the TEC-Tree and both dynamic tree designs. For this example with 2 trees and
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a counter size of 32 bits, the total on-chip memory cost would then be only 64 bits.
Root Storage Size = counter size ∗ number of trees (3.12)
3.7.2 Performance Overhead
A dynamic authentication tree requires additional computational overhead on each
write transaction compared to the TEC-Tree. Every write requires that a recursive
check for rebalancing is applied. An extra counter node must be read for each level
in addition to the information that the TEC-Tree requires. If the tree does need
to be rebalanced there are extra computations and writes to memory that must be
performed. Generally, a dynamic tree rebalance does not happen frequently, espe-
cially with memory access patterns that frequently access certain areas in memory.
This rebalance overhead is usually minimal and is explored further in the implemen-
tation results in Section 4.5.3. Due to the number of extra computations performed,
it is expected that a memory access pattern that utilizes writes to memory more
frequently than reads may perform worse. The worst-case scenario for a dynamic
tree would involve a uniform random distribution of memory accesses through the
entire protected memory address range. If each memory address were accessed with
the same frequency, the tree would statistically diverge to a balanced tree. This tree
would include worse write performance than a TEC-Tree due to the extra rebalancing
calculations. Contrarily, the best-case scenario for this structure would be a mem-
ory design that most frequently accesses a single memory address, and that memory
address is mostly read instead of written. Performance speedup occurs when a read
or write transaction occurs on a data address that has been shifted higher in the
dynamic tree than it would be in the corresponding balanced tree structure. In order
for a dynamic tree to perform better than the TEC-Tree design, this speedup must
outweigh the slowdown caused by the additional tree calculations.
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3.7.3 Counter Bit Length
Counter bit length is an important customizable part of the tree’s design. Whenever
a counter reaches the max value it is able to represent, the authentication tree cannot
allow the counter to simply overflow. If the counter overflowed, a nonce may be
repeated, and this can leak information to an attacker. In order to prevent this,
each time the counter overflows the secret encryption key must be regenerated. All
encrypted tree data must first be decrypted and re-encrypted with the new key,
requiring a large amount of time to complete these operations. A counter length
with a size large enough to prevent too frequent overflows must be chosen in order to
minimize the impact of this performance. For many applications a counter size of 32
bits will take an extremely large amount of time to overflow; however, for applications
that run for long periods of time, it could be a concern. Naturally, increasing the
counter size to reduce the performance head will increase the size of off-chip storage
utilized by the tree.
3.7.4 Leaf Node Data Block Size
The size of the data block per leaf node can be refined to provide a balance between
performance and storage size. Whenever memory is accessed, the entire data block
must be decrypted because the entire block is encrypted together. If only part of the
block was decrypted or re-encrypted without the rest of the block, the encryption
scheme would fail and the data would become corrupted. In light of this, increasing
the data block size per leaf node will reduce the storage required, as fewer leaf nodes
would be required to protect the entire portion of memory; however, the performance
of each memory transaction would be reduced as more data must be accessed each
time.
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Figure 3.8: Off-Chip Memory Overhead Example
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3.8 Optimality Analysis
Optimal binary search trees provide the lowest cost to access each leaf node of the
tree given a set of weights for each node. An unordered optimal tree can be built
using Huffman coding [22] while an ordered optimal tree can be constructed with the
Hu-Tucker algorithm [23]. A software implementation written in the C programming
language was developed for both the Hu-Tucker algorithm and the algorithm pro-
posed in Section 3.6 for comparison of optimality. Due to the nature of the proposed
algorithm, rebalancing conditions only consider adjacent nodes of the nodes being
accessed. It is possible that nodes are accessed in a pattern that the tree is not opti-
mal due to limitations of the algorithm not extending to check the entire tree. 10,000
different trees with different weights for the leaves and different memory accesses were
constructed with both the Hu-Tucker and dynamic tree algorithms. The total cost of
each tree was then calculated and compared to determine the optimality of the dy-
namic tree. As the Hu-Tucker tree is guaranteed to be optimal, these measurements
were used as a baseline for optimality. In 10,000 different cases, only 20 Dynamic
Trees were not optimal, leading to a 99.8% chance of the dynamic tree remaining
optimal. The maximum difference in cost was 38 while the lowest was 1. The average
difference in cost was 5.7; however, this average does not represent a significant statis-
tic as the difference in cost for a tree with 10,000 memory accesses would be higher
than a tree with 10 memory access. Concluding from these results, the difference in
optimality from the proposed dynamic tree algorithm and the Hu-Tucker algorithm
is minimal, with a 99.8% chance of remaining optimal with a sample size of 10,000.
Furthermore, when there is a difference in optimality that difference is minuscule and





Many embedded systems have an exposed memory bus line from the on-chip processor
to off-chip memory such as DDR RAM. It is possible to observe transactions on this
memory bus or even inject modified data that causes unwanted behavior from the
system. As discussed in Section 2.1 the main focus of protection is bus attacks; in
particular, protection against spoofing attacks, splicing attacks, and replay attacks
are the main concern. Replay attacks are the most costly threat to defend against as it
requires capturing an instance of time in which certain data is invalid. To combat this,
the security model assumes our system’s on-chip memory is secure against attackers
and cannot be observed or tampered with. It is also assumed that the OS kernel can
also be trusted and is resistant to attacks. Memory bus data observation and data
injection is the only weakness that this model attempts to address. Data leakage and
side-channel attacks such as differential power analysis attacks are beyond the scope
of this model. DDR RAM is generally accessed very often and is significantly relied
upon. It is very important that the design to protect memory does not provide large
levels of performance overhead. Any additional performance slowdown is significant in
the execution of a program. As described by Figure 4.1, a custom memory controller
platform placed between the CPU and the DDR Memory facilitates the memory
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encryption and authentication. As speed is a priority, an FPGA’s programmable
logic is used to implement the controller in hardware. A ZedBoard™ development
board with a Xilinx Zynq®-7000 All Programmable SoC is the target platform for
this design. The design can be extended to any comparable platform that can make
use of the full AXI-4 interface. As the ZedBoard is a low cost development kit, more
sophisticated FPGA’s may be able to run the design with higher clock frequencies
and make even better use of the design.
Figure 4.1: Target Security Model
4.2 AXI-4 Interface
The Advanced eXtensible Interface (AXI) is a widespread flexible high-performance
bus interface that is commonly used in on-chip communication applications. Zynq
processors incorporate high-performance full AXI-4 interfaces into their design in
order to allow for easy communication with designs in the programmable logic. As
a result of that fact, the AXI interface was chosen for the implementation of the
authentication tree memory controller design. Many optional signals and features
exist for the interface allowing for a versatile number of functionalities depending on
the application [26]. AXI-Lite interfaces reduce the capabilities of AXI into simple 32-
bit read and write transactions. Due to the complexity and versatility of the memory
controller’s design, a full AXI interface was instead chosen in order to provide support
for a wider range of applications.
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4.3 Memory Controller Pipeline
4.3.1 Encryption Pipeline
While individual components of the AXI-4 interface are not by themselves compli-
cated, integrating a completely transparent memory controller design for each possible
combination of AXI capabilities quickly increases the complexity. Aiming to reduce
this complexity, the design presented here utilizes a heavily modified version of the
AXI-4 transparent memory encryption pipeline provided in [25]. Figure 4.2 describes
the original unmodified encryption only pipeline design [25].
Figure 4.2: Transparent Memory Encryption Pipeline
The design incorporates an effective way to implement memory security for a
variety of memory types with little effort required from a user. As the goal is to
remain transparent to the user, the user of the secure memory will not have to perform
any additional steps in order to perform memory transactions. A read-modify-write
approach is followed. When a processor sends a transaction to the controller, first
the controller will read and decrypt the requested data. If a write transaction was
specified, the decrypted plaintext is then forwarded to a data modifier, which is
responsible for merging the requested write data with the data retrieved from memory.
Once the data block is properly modified with the written data, the entire block is
sent to the encryption engine. After the data is properly encrypted depending on
47
CHAPTER 4. MEMORY CONTROLLER FRAMEWORK
the cipher implemented, the final encrypted ciphertext is forwarded to memory to be
written. If instead a read transaction was specified, after the decryption stage the
decrypted plaintext is then forwarded to the processor. Before reaching the processor
the plaintext data is filtered to remove any additional data that was necessary to
store depending on the encryption scheme employed. Requests also support bursts as
specified by the AXI protocol, which is handled by the wrap burst cache component
in the pipeline.
4.3.2 Encryption and Authentication Pipeline
The encryption pipeline design provided by [25] was heavily modified in order to pro-
vide support for Dynamic Authentication Trees. Dynamic trees require additional
tree metadata to first be read from memory in order to generate appropriate requests
for new intermediate nodes. Therefore, the pipeline needs to return data read from
memory to the component that generates requests. The modified pipeline including
components required for authentication is described by Figure 4.3. The work pre-
sented in [25] also includes an implementation for a TEC-Tree design using a modified
version of the encryption pipeline; however, due to the large difference in operation be-
tween a dynamic authentication tree and a TEC-Tree, the simple encryption pipeline
was utilized as a base for the design instead. The TEC-Tree authentication pipeline
is used as a performance comparison for the finished design.
Figure 4.3: Transparent Memory Encryption and Authentication Pipeline
48
CHAPTER 4. MEMORY CONTROLLER FRAMEWORK
Due to the fact that read requests now need to be returned to the request gener-
ator, the pipeline has been further separated into two paths, a read request pipeline
and a write request pipeline. A master state machine is used in the Tree Request
Generator component in order to determine which tree nodes must be accessed and
updated. True to its name, the Tree Request Generator then generates the appro-
priate requests for tree node processing into the read and write pipelines. When a
request is received from the processor, the root number for the memory address is
calculated. The root of the tree is checked to see if the data node has been accessed
yet. The root itself is stored in BRAM that is embedded in the programmable logic,
as it is can be considered secure against an attacker with physical access. If the root
has not yet been accessed then the data for that tree needs to be initialized. A Tree
Initializer component has been added to correctly populate the initial tree data with
the data specified in Algorithm 3. The Tree Request Generator specifies whether or
not a request is an initialization request. If this is the case, then the Tree Initial-
izer calculates the appropriate data values based on the memory address. Otherwise,
normal requests are simply forwarded through the initializer with no modification.
Both the read and memory write responders were modified to ensure that the master
AXI signal response was generated to the processor only when the original request
was processed. This is necessary because, in the original encryption pipeline, only
the original data block is accessed. The dynamic tree requires multiple intermediate
requests to first be sent to process the tree data before processing the original request.
Figure 4.4 displays the state machine used to process read requests.
The state machine remains at an idle state until a read request is received. Once
a request is issued by the processor, the tree that is being requested to access is
checked to ensure it has been accessed before. If it has not, the tree is initialized to
a balanced tree state. Once the initialization is finished, the data node that contains
the requested data is first read. The data node is then decrypted and the stored
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Figure 4.4: Read Request State Machine
metadata is used to determine which counter node must be read next as the parent
node. That parent node is then read, and the store counts are compared to ensure
data has not been tampered with. If the counts do not match, an authentication error
is raised and sent to the processor. Otherwise, the process is repeated recursively, and
the next parent node is read until the root of the tree is reached. After reaching the
root node, the count contained in the root node is then compared to the secure root
stored on-chip. If these counts do not match, the same authentication error process is
completed and the processor is notified. Finally, if everything authenticates properly,
the original data that was requested is extracted from the original data node and
forwarded to the processor.
4.4 Ciphers and Modes of Operation
Customizability is one of the primary benefits of this design, and in that spirit, any
cipher can be used in the encryption pipeline. The design tested here uses AES as
the encryption engine. AES is a widely adopted standard cipher with quick timings
that is able to be efficiently implemented on an FPGA. The only limitation on the
cipher to be used is that the cipher mode of operation must propagate errors to
later ciphertext blocks. Block cipher modes such as Electronic Code Book (ECB)
and Counter Mode (CTR) do not propagate errors to ciphertext blocks beside the
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current block being decrypted. Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode was chosen for
the test implementation as each block of ciphertext relies on all plaintext blocks that
have been previously processed. As the payload of a data node is decrypted first,
any change in the payload will result in changes to the metadata, which will then
cause the authentication to fail. A significant drawback of the CBC mode is that
each encryption and decryption operation is sequential, relying on the previously
processed data block before the next block’s processing can begin. Parallelization
of the cryptographic operations is then not possible if it is desired to speed up the
encryption or decryption of data.
CBC mode still requires the data size to be aligned with the limitations of the
block cipher’s size. In the case of using AES as a cipher, the data block must be
a multiple of 128 bits. The implementation example provided in this thesis utilizes
AES for both the data nodes and the counter nodes. In this case, the data nodes
have a size of 80 bytes, which is aligned properly with this cipher, but the counter
nodes have a size of 24 bytes which is misaligned by an extra 8 bytes. The CBC mode
was then modified to take advantage of the ciphertext stealing (CTS) operation that
allows for the processing of data blocks of any size. This is achieved by padding
the last incomplete block with a portion of the second to last’s block ciphertext and
encrypting the padded block. Because the padded block’s plaintext then includes the
partial ciphertext of the second to last block, it is not necessary to store the full block
in memory as it will be recovered later on decryption. Figure 4.5 demonstrates the
behavior of a ciphertext stealing mode.
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Figure 4.5: Ciphertext Stealing [1]
4.5 Results
The results presented in this section are based on an implementation of the proposed
design written in the VHDL hardware description language. Synthesis was performed
with Xilinx Vivado version 2020.1 and targeted the ZedBoard development kit (part
xc7z020clg484-1) using the Xilinx Zynq-7000 All Programmable SoC. Due to the
complexity of the programmable logic design and the limitations of the ZedBoard,
the design was evaluated with a clock frequency target of 50 MHz. This limitation
is due to the routing delay in the critical path of the implementation. The FPGA
used is an entry-level model with a lower speed than more sophisticated platforms.
Running this design on a higher level model will allow for a significant increase in
clock frequency. For programmable logic utilization comparisons, the total number of
resources available for various Xilinx FPGAs is displayed in Table 4.1. Part xc7z2020
is the SoC with FPGA used by the ZedBoard. Compared to the other FPGA parts
available, the resources provided by the Zedboard are relatively small.
Three different designs were implemented for comparison. First the TEC-Tree was
tested as it is currently one of the lowest overhead methods of providing encryption
and authentication. The original dynamic skewed tree was also chosen for evaluation
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Table 4.1: Reference resources available for a sample set of Xilinx FPGAs
Part LUTs Flip Flops DSPs BRAM Tiles
xc7z2020 46,200 92,400 160 95
xczu9eg 274,080 548,160 2,520 912
xcvu9p 1,182,240 2,364,480 6,840 2,160
xcu250 1,341,000 2,749,000 11,508 1,766
as the performance for the proposed design should be similar. Each test performed
was run with the same configuration of 1 MB of memory protected by 2048 trees with
each leaf node protecting 64 bytes of memory. The Zynq processor uses an AXI data
width of 32 bits, while the memory interface uses an AXI data width of 64 bits to
allow for faster memory transactions. The memory controller handles the difference
in memory sizes and generates the appropriate responses for both the master and
slave AXI devices. For the scope of this design, a tree arity of two was tested for
each configuration. The proposed dynamic tree algorithm currently does not support
higher arities, but this can be expanded in future work.
The performances of the dynamic designs were evaluated using AES-128 in CBC
mode with ciphertext stealing to match data block alignments. The TEC-Tree was
evalued using the lightweight ASCON cipher in CBC mode, instead of AES. The
particular version of the AES cipher implemented requires only 12 cycles for decryp-
tion and encryption operations on 128-bit data blocks. The ASCON cipher requires
6 clock cycles for its operation. AES has been chosen for evaluation as it is a stan-
dard and widely used cipher that lends itself well to an HDL implementation. Any
cipher may be chosen for use, for example using a lightweight cipher will increase
performance by requiring fewer clock cycles for each read and write operation. It is
important to note however that the choice of cipher and mode of operation is impor-
tant to ensure proper security. ECB and CTR modes are discouraged as the lack of
error propagation eliminates the effectiveness of the block-level AREA authentication
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technique.
The designs were evaluated for correctness and performance using the Xilinx AXI
Verification IP (AXI VIP). The verification IPs ensure signal behavior and timing are
appropriate for the AXI-4 interface. They do not, however, ensure data written to
and read from memory represent proper values. A wrapper testbench was written in
SystemVerilog to both control the AXI VIP’s and ensure the memory contained the
correct data on a read and write operation. A master AXI VIP was used to simulate
the processor sending initial read or write requests to the memory controller. A second
AXI VIP was configured for slave responses in memory-mapped mode, allowing the IP
to simulate a BRAM with appropriate timings. Figure 4.6 displays the configuration
of the test environment for these performance tests.
Figure 4.6: Test Environment Configuration
4.5.1 Synthesis Results
The design was synthesized in Xilinx Vivado version 2020.1 and compared to the
implementation of the TEC-Tree [25] and the Dynamic Skewed Tree framework [21].
The TEC-Tree implementation uses an Ascon cipher for the encryption and decryp-
tion of data, while the Dynamic Trees both use AES-128 for their encryption engine.
As displayed in Table 4.2, the method of encryption contributes to a large portion
of the programmable fabric usage. In order to better compare the designs, the usage
was measured with and without the encryption.
As expected, the TEC-Tree design utilizes the least number of each component
as it uses the simplest design. Most of the differences in utilization can be accounted
for by the added components for the dynamic tree request generation and initializa-
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Table 4.2: Authentication Tree Synthesis Results
TEC-Tree Unordered DAT Ordered DAT
No Encryption
LUTs 3582 8521 12404
Flip Flops 3064 5953 8475
DSPs 0 15 21
BRAM Tile 1 1 1
Encryption
LUTs 9398 11438 15321
Flip Flops 4349 6738 9260
DSPs 0 15 21
BRAM Tiles 1 1 1
tion. The state machine itself requires a significant number of flip-flops and LUTs to
manage state transitions and state outputs. While the TEC-Tree design can simply
generate all necessary requests without reading data from memory, both DAT designs
require logic to both store read data and translate the read data to appropriate re-
quests for tree traversal and modification. The unordered DAT design also requires
fewer resources to implement than the ordered DAT. This can be attributed to the
additional tree structure and rebalancing complexity that comes with the added con-
dition of maintaining terminal nodes’ ordering. While there is only one reblancing
algorithm used in the unordered DAT design, the ordered design requires three differ-
ent algorithms to be implemented based on the current state of the tree to be restruc-
tured. Additionally, the ordered DAT’s state machine contains a larger number of
states that need to be implemented. The unordered algorithm is only concerned with
the current node, the sibling node, the parent node, and the uncle node. While the
ordered algorithm may need to access the grand-parent node, the grand-uncle node,
and even the great grand-parent node’s data. This results in an additional state for
both generating the requests and reading the node data back after the data has been
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retrieved and decrypted. Additionally, each potential node requires more flip-flops
to store the metadata while it is processed and modified. For perspective, Table 4.3
contains the utilization percentage of each component available in the xc7z2020 SoC.
Table 4.3: Authentication Tree Synthesis Results Percentage Utilized
TEC-Tree Unordered DAT Ordered DAT
No Encryption
LUTs 7.75% 18.44% 26.85%
Flip Flops 3.32% 6.44% 9.17%
DSPs 0% 25% 35%
BRAM Tiles 1.05% 1.05% 1.05%
Encryption
LUTs 20.34% 24.76% 33.16%
Flip Flops 4.71% 7.29% 10.02%
DSPs 0% 25% 35%
BRAM Tiles 1.05% 1.05% 1.05%
The number of LUT’s used for all implementations is between 7% to 27%, and
the number of Flip Flops used is between 3% to 10%. While the DAT’s utilization
is considerably higher than the TEC-Tree implementation, the overall usage is still
fairly low as there are many more LUTs and Flip Flops available for additions to the
design or other programmable logic. This programmable logic utilization is notably
low if compared to any of the higher grade models listed in Table 4.1. Interestingly,
the DAT design both use DSPs for their synthesis that the TEC-Tree does not require.
The DSPs are used in the calculation of the write-back addresses for each node after
their metadata has been modified. These address calculations are simple addition and
multiplication operations using the initial tree start address and the node metadata.
If the use of DSPs is not desired, the HDL can be modified or the synthesis tools can
be specified to not use DSPs.
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4.5.2 Implementation Results
The design’s netlist generated from synthesis was then implemented for the xc7z2020
SoC. Default Vivado 2020.1 implementation and optimization settings were used. The
resulting utilization is contained in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Authentication Tree Implementation Results
TEC-Tree Unordered DAT Ordered DAT
No Encryption
LUTs 3270 8394 11649
Flip Flops 2893 5651 7582
DSPs 0 15 21
BRAM Tile 1 1 1
Encryption
LUTs 9018 11251 14506
Flip Flops 4122 6419 8350
DSPs 0 15 21
BRAM Tiles 1 1 1
As expected, the utilization results are very similar to the synthesis results. Over-
all, the component usage is slightly less than that of synthesis due to the optimizations
that took place. Of particular note, the proposed ordered DAT design’s synthesis re-
ports 1,2404 LUTs and 8,475 flip flops used, but the implemented design only requires
1,1649 LUTs and 7,582 flip flops. Additionally, the percentage of components used
was calculated and displayed in Table 4.5. Naturally, the percentage utilization for
each component is reduced as well, with the Ordered DAT still requiring the most
resources. Despite this large utilization, the Ordered DAT design uses a fairly low
number of components given the number of resources available. While the synthesis
and implementation results for all three designs are limited to 50 MHz, it is worth
noting that a target device with more resources and better timings will be able to
achieve higher frequencies and better performance overheads.
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Table 4.5: Authentication Tree Implementation Results Percentage Utilized
TEC-Tree Unordered DAT Ordered DAT
No Encryption
LUTs 7.08% 18.17% 25.21%
Flip Flops 3.13% 6.12% 8.21%
DSPs 0% 25% 35%
BRAM Tiles 1.05% 1.05% 1.05%
Encryption
LUTs 19.52% 24.35% 31.40%
Flip Flops 4.45% 6.95% 9.04%
DSPs 0% 25% 35%
BRAM Tiles 1.05% 1.05% 1.05%
4.5.3 Performance
The designs for all three methods were evaluated for performance in various conditions
with different memory access patterns. The TEC-Tree design tested was provided by
[25], while the dynamic tree implementations were manually implemented and written
in VHDL based on the framework outlined in Section 4.3. As previously discussed,
due to timing limitations in the implementation on the target xc7z2020 SoC, each
design was run at 50 MHz. Each designs’ customizations were standardized to make
direct performance comparisons easier. The master interface of the pipeline was
configured to accept a data length of 32 bits, while the slave interface was configured
for a data length of 64 bits. The size of memory to be protected was configured for
256 MB and a data block size of 64 bytes for each design
The dynamic nature of the proposed tree designs requires different scenarios to
fully explore the different possible performances the design may have. It is important
to test the worst and best case scenarios for the design, in order to help determine
which use cases it may perform better in. First, the designs were tested utilizing a
fully random test suite. As each memory address is random, there is a randomly
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distributed spread of accesses throughout the entire tree. While this type of memory
access pattern is very unrealistic in practical applications, this type of access pattern
is the worst-case scenario for a dynamic tree which makes it important to note. The
results of this performance are displayed in Figure 4.7. Each test was run with 10,000
write and read access to dynamically construct the tree and test timings. While
the TEC-Tree read and write timings remain consistent throughout the tests, the
dynamic trees timings consistently change. In order to provide valid results, the total
average read and write times were calculated for comparison.
Figure 4.7: Authentication Tree Latency: Random Distribution with 8 Leaf Nodes
As expected, the dynamic trees here perform worse compared to the TEC-Tree’s
performance. As a result of the uniform randomly distribution of memory accesses,
the law of large numbers states that each data node is accessed approximately equally.
The end result would then be a balanced tree that has additional data accesses and
authentication computations compared to the TEC-Tree. The additional rebalancing
operations causes significant slowdown in write operations for both dynamic authen-
tication trees, as each rebalance will ultimately be reversed as the tree is uniformly
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accessed in the future. Write operations for the unordered dynamic tree were an
average approximately 1.61 times slower than a static TEC-Tree, while the ordered
dynamic tree’s write accesses were 1.74 times slower. Despite not including extra
authentication calculations, read operations were slower for both dynamic trees as
well. This can be accounted for by both the varying levels of data nodes as the tree
is rebalanced and the fact that dynamic trees require additional metadata to be read
for each read. Due to the additional metadata that must be accessed to traverse the
tree, even if a data node in the dynamic tree structure maintained the same level of
access as the TEC-Tree, the read would be slightly slower than the TEC-Tree’s read.
The average read speed for the unordered dynamic tree was 1.49 times slower than
the TEC-Tree’s read speed and the average read speed for the ordered dynamic tree
was 1.47 times slower. These read speeds aren’t as slow as the average write speed
because each read does not need to additionally access the uncle node for rebalancing
checks as each write operation requires.
These limitations of the dynamic tree design cause a uniform random distribution
of accesses to be the absolute worst-case scenario for authentication performance.
Luckily, in reality a processor with a completely random memory access pattern is
extremely rare. If this access pattern was employed in a real-world scenario, it would
not be recommended to utilize a dynamic tree for authentication, but instead rely on
a balanced tree design.
The previous test was performed with a total of eight leaf nodes protecting mem-
ory. With this configuration the TEC-Tree’s leaf nodes would be at level log2N =
log2 8 = 3 where N is the number of counter nodes and with the 0th level being the
root of the tree. Both dynamic tree’s leaf node levels vary between the 1st level and
the level equivalent to the number of data nodes in the tree minus one in the most
extreme case. In order to test the impact that increasing the number of data nodes
and levels of the tree might have, the same test was rerun with the trees’ configura-
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tions set to include 16 leaf nodes per tree. The results of that this test is contained
in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: Authentication Tree Latency: Random Distribution with 16 Leaf Nodes
Doubling the number of leaf nodes of a balanced tree will increase the number of
levels of the tree by one, as shown by log2 16 = 4. In a dynamic tree, the maximum
level increases significantly more as the max level for a dynamic tree is N − 1 =
16− 1 = 15. It can be then be inferred that the dynamic tree’s performance in both
the extreme worst and best-case scenarios is further heightened by the number of leaf
nodes in the tree. In the worst-case scenario, the dynamic tree adds an additional
15 − 4 = 11 extra levels for the tree traversal. Oppositely, in the best-case scenario,
the dynamic tree reduces the number of levels to traverse by 4 − 1 = 3. While the
worst-case scenario does indeed add a significant number of levels to access compared
to the number reduced by the best-case scenario, due to traditional memory access
patterns the worst-case scenario will almost never happen. The weighted nature of
the tree and memory access means that the nodes that are stored that far down
the tree will be very infrequently accessed compared to those nearer to the root of
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the tree. The time saved by accessing these nearer nodes then may outweigh these
extra performance overheads. As Figure 4.8 demonstrates, increasing the number
of nodes increases the write time of the TEC-Tree by 1.14 times and increases the
read time by 1.18 times. The unordered dynamic tree’s write time is increased by
1.3 times and the ordered is increase by 1.26 times. For read times, the unordered is
increased by 1.197 times, and the ordered is increased by 1.2 times. As expected, the
dynamic trees’ worst-case scenario performance is impacted more significantly more
than the TEC-Tree’s performance when increasing the number of leaf nodes in the
tree structures.
The second test applied to each authentication tree was designed to test the best-
case scenario for a dynamic tree, as opposed to the first test that introduces the worst
case. For this test, only a single data node is accessed to allow the dynamic tree to
restructure it to the top of the tree. 10,000 reads and writes were applied to this
single node and the average read and write times were recorded for each design, as
displayed in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Authentication Tree Latency: Single Node Access with 8 Leaf Nodes
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As the TEC-Tree’s tree remains balanced, read and write access times remain
consistent no matter the memory access pattern. The read and write latencies are
then equivalent to those recorded in the first test case. The dynamic trees conversely
increase in performance significantly, with the read speeds beating the read speed
of the TEC-Tree in both dynamic tree designs. For the unordered DAT, the write
latency achieves a 1.5 times speedup compared to the original test case, and the read
latency gains a speedup of 1.76 times. Similarly, the ordered DAT achieves a write
speedup of 1.65 times and a read speedup of 1.74 times. In this scenario, the write
speeds for each dynamic tree are only slightly slower than that of the TEC-Tree,
while the read speeds are significantly less. The performance of the dynamic trees
would then be favored over the TEC-Tree in scenarios where the number of read
accesses outweighs the write operations. Although write-heavy patterns may suffer
slightly. The experiment was also repeated with 16 leaf nodes to measure the effects
of increasing the number of possible tree levels on each tree type. Figure 4.10 contains
the results of this test.
Figure 4.10: Authentication Tree Latency: Single Node Access with 16 Leaf Nodes
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The TEC-Tree’s read and write speeds are the same as the read and write speeds in
the 16 leaf node random distribution test. This behavior is expected because the TEC-
Tree does not rebalance. The dynamic authentication trees’ performance remains the
same as the previous test with eight nodes. This result can be attributed to the fact
that when accessing a single node, it will quickly be rebalanced to the top level of
the tree. Even though adding additional nodes will add an extra rebalance operation
for the node to reach the top of the tree, with a large enough number of memory
accesses this additional overhead is quickly averaged out and becomes insignificant.
Both the unordered and ordered DAT beat the TEC-Tree’s performance in read and
write operations as the TEC-Tree must access four levels each time while the DATs
only need to access two, the node itself and the root. In this case the unordered DAT
gains a speedup of 1.05 times on write operations and a speedup of 1.39 times on read
operations. The ordered DAT gains a speedup of 1.08 times on write operations and
a speedup of 1.39 times on read operations. While the previous two tests represent
the worst and best-case scenarios for the dynamic tree’s performance, a third test was
run to provide a realistic memory access pattern. In this test, contiguous memory was
accessed in order to simulate reading and writing to a large array in memory. The
previous test may provide an accurate representation of accessing a smaller array in
memory, but it would require the array to remain within the size range of the tree’s
data block configuration. Figure 4.11 demonstrates the results of accessing a large
array in memory that spans the entire tree size.
Once again, the read and write speeds of the TEC-Tree remain consistent with
previous tests. Naturally, the performance of both dynamic trees falls in-between the
cases presented by the previous two tests. Unfortunately, both designs do not quite
achieve the same level of performance as the TEC-Tree. The unordered DATs write
speeds are 1.44 times slower and the write speeds are 1.23 times slower. The ordered
DAT achieves an average write speed that is 1.5 times slower and an average read
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Figure 4.11: Authentication Tree Latency: Contiguous Access with 8 Leaf Nodes
speed that is also 1.23 times slower. This difference in performance can be attributed
to the fact that in this memory access pattern when the first data block is being
accessed it quickly shifts the rest of the data blocks further down in priority than
the current one. Once the next block is accessed, this happens again until the data
block size is exceeded and the process is repeated. However, if this array were to
be accessed again in the future, the performance would be increased as the area of
memory has been accessed before. To compare the performance impact of increasing
the number of nodes in the dynamic tree, the test was run again with 16 leaf nodes,
and the results are displayed in Figure 4.12.
Interestingly, because the array is accessed enough times to maintain the same tree
level configuration for the nodes protecting the array’s memory, the performance of
the read and write operations for the dynamic trees remains the same as the previous
test with eight leaf nodes. While in this scenario the dynamic trees still perform
worse than the TEC-Tree, if the node count is continued to be increased the dynamic
trees will overtake the TEC-Tree in performance. Intuitively, this makes sense as the
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Figure 4.12: Authentication Tree Latency: Contiguous Access with 16 Leaf Nodes
TEC-Tree’s nodes are equally level, which means nodes that are never accessed are
as equally weighted as those that are accessed the most frequently. Increasing the
node count for the dynamic tree allows the nodes that are never accessed to be much
further down on the tree than the TEC-Tree’s unaccessed nodes.
Overall, the TEC-Tree outperforms the dynamic tree designs in scenarios where
memory access patterns do not favor portions of memory over others. The dynamic
tree implicitly contains higher overheads on write operations as there are more cal-
culations that must be done in order to ensure that the tree is properly balanced.
However, the read and write performance on nodes that are frequently accessed have
the potential to increase the overall memory operation speed in certain scenarios. As
processors generally are more likely to access memory that has already been accessed,
this dynamic structure has the potential to massively outperform TEC-Trees. Accord-
ing to the results of the tests presented previously, the DAT has a larger advantage
over the TEC-Tree in configurations with a larger number of leaf nodes per tree. The
application that an authentication tree is used in can then be evaluated for mem-
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ory access patterns, storage requirements, and memory performance requirements in
order to tailor a specific tree type to that application. Additionally, the design pre-
senting in this thesis is a proof of concept with much room for improvement. Further
optimizations and the addition of tree node caches may allow the dynamic tree struc-
ture to overtake the performance TEC-Tree in general use applications. For easier
comparison, a summary of the results of the each timing test is contained in Table
4.6 and Figures 4.13and 4.14.
Table 4.6: Summary of Timing Results
TEC-Tree (ns) Unordered DAT (ns) Ordered DAT (ns)Access
Pattern
Leaf
Nodes Write Read Write Read Write Read
8 2520 1420 4068 2115 4387 2089
Test 1
16 2880 1668.6 5289 2533 5537 2515
8 2520 1420 2707.6 1204.4 2663 1200
Test 2
16 2880 1668.6 2731 1204 2663 1200
8 2520 1420 3625 1750 3778 1750
Test 3
16 2880 1668.6 3625 1750 3778 1750
Figure 4.13: Summary of 8 Node Timing Results
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Figure 4.14: Summary of 16 Node Timing Results
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Future Work
While the work presented in this paper is complete for multiple configurations and
thoroughly tested, there are still many improvements and optimizations that can
improve upon the design significantly. This framework is a proof of concept for a new
customizable encryption and authentication pipeline based on adding improvements
and options for scalability and customizability of previous works. As detailed in the
previous analysis, the new dynamic ordered algorithm focused on in this work is best
used in specific applications However it can certainly be improved upon in order to
provide more use cases, optimality, and flexibility in future designs.
5.1.1 Tree Arity
Perhaps one of the greatest limiting factors of both the unordered and ordered dy-
namic tree algorithms is the arity of the constructed tree. The largest challenge to
overcome would be to provide more rebalancing algorithms for each case that might
be possible if retaining the order of the leaf nodes is important. While it is definitely
possible to extend the algorithms for customizable arities, the number of checks added
towards restructuring the tree would increase the overhead for write operations sig-
nificantly. For example, if the arity of the tree was increased to four instead of two,
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there would be three more additional uncle nodes that must be read from memory,
decrypted, and compared for rebalancing. In addition, when a rebalance does occur,
additional performance slowdown would be incurred in order to update multiple node
relations per counter node. As for metadata storage, there would be more metadata
stored for the position of each node, instead of just storing a single bit for whether the
node is a left or right node. It would be expected that increasing the tree’s arity would
overall decrease the average height of each node, thus decreasing the total number of
levels that need to be accessed for both read and write operations. All read operations
would then be significantly increased in speed; however, write operations would be
slowed down with the additional tree rebalancing checks and operations. Depending
on the memory access patterns, this could increase overall operational speed or the
extra overhead might be too significant to be useful. As with any increase in authen-
tication tree arity, the overall memory storage would also be increased due to the
added relationships that need to be tracked for each node.
5.1.2 Encryption and Decryption Parallelization
In its current form, the design framework presented only utilizes a single instance of
a cipher’s encryption and decryption engines. It is possible to instantiate multiple
of these components in order to encrypt and decrypt multiple data blocks at the
same time if there are enough resources available in the programmable logic fabric.
Unfortunately, the block level AREA technique employed in this design relies on error
propagating cipher block modes of operation. These error propagating modes rely on
previously processed data blocks in order to begin processing the next block, allowing
for only sequential operation and not enabling parallelization. Separate nodes could
be encrypted and decrypted in parallel if that information was available to the design
at the same time. Generally, the encryption and decryption process is already quicker
to perform than it is to retrieve additional information from memory. A dual-port
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RAM could potentially be utilized to read or write multiple tree nodes at once, and
then multiple cipher components could be used to process this data at the same time.
5.1.3 Caches and Leaf Node Ordering
Caches have widely been used to store frequently accessed data to enable faster re-
trieval of that data to speed up memory operations. This technique has been expanded
to multiple forms of authentication trees in the past, including the work presented
in [19]. This framework currently does not support caching for the dynamic tree
information, but this can be implemented in the future. There are multiple different
types of caches that could be utilized to speed up the overall design’s functionality.
Tree information itself could be stored in a cache in order to prevent the need to
reread more frequently accessed nodes from memory every time the tree is accessed.
As most of the slowdown in the dynamic tree design is caused by requiring the infor-
mation from nodes to be read to traverse the tree, caching these nodes would provide
a considerable increase in performance. A second type of cache could be implemented
that caches payload data. The payload data would be the actual data requested to be
written to memory by the processor. This second cache could be implemented instead
of or in conjunction with tree node caching. This would help increase performance
significantly as this data would be more readily available and external memory would
not have to be accessed every time data is read or modified.
Considering that processors are generally more likely to access data that has
already been accessed, a dynamic tree design with caches could be used to pro-
vide extremely minimal performance overhead compared to traditional authentication
tree methods. Additionally, the ordered dynamic algorithm proposed in this paper
could potentially increase cache performance by providing the caches with informa-
tion about node order and relationships. For example, a cache could predict that a
large array is being accessed in the running program. The nodes are ordered and the
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cache could preemptively store the sequential data blocks that will be accessed in the
future.
5.1.4 Compiler Assistance
Instead of initializing each authentication tree to a balanced tree on startup, the
compiler could communicate memory access patterns to the programmable logic or
a bootloader before the program begins operation [27]. In the case of a dynamic
tree, this would allow improvements in authentication speeds to be available from
the very beginning of the program’s execution as opposed to needing some run-time
for the restructuring to begin. While the dynamic algorithm here performs a form of
dynamic analysis for memory access patterns, a compiler can perform a static analysis
of the program to be run at compile time. This static analysis can then be used to
initialize the tree based on expected memory accesses. In the case that the compiler’s
static analysis does not provide a good prediction, the dynamic tree algorithms can
then be used in order to correct the tree’s optimization on the fly. Additionally, this
analysis could potentially prevent unnecessary rebalancing overhead by telling the
dynamic tree to not rebalance on conditions that will need to be rebalanced back to
the previous configuration.
5.2 Conclusions
The importance of embedded security continues to rise as devices with important
functionality steadily increases in usage. The work presented includes an authen-
tication tree design that improves upon existing techniques to provide an increase
in performance while providing adequate protection against attackers with physical
access to a device. While current memory authentication techniques are expensive,
this design allows for further customizations to further suit the specific application it
is to be employed in. Additionally, a transparent memory controller that allows for
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encryption and authentication is provided. The memory controller contains a large
number of customization and support for platforms with different memory speed and
size requirements. A user is able to integrate the design in their system without a
large amount of prior knowledge or experience.
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